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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW:

DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN FLORIDA

Our constitutional protection against double jeopardy, or former
jeopardy, as it is sometimes called, is contained in the words: "No person
shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."' This
principle emanates from the common law. 2 In early times it was devised
to prevent overzealous prosecuting attorneys from harassing a defendant
by further prosecution for an offense of which he had already been acquitted or convicted. It is embodied in substantially the same form in the
constitutions of the great majority of states. The Legislature of the State
of Florida further emphasized the provision by enacting it as a statute
3

in 1891.

I. WHEN

LEGAL JEOPARDY ATTACHES

In a criminal case the accused is put in jeopardy when both of two
conditions are satisfied: (1) he is placed on trial in a court of competent
jurisdiction upon an indictment or information legally sufficient to sustain
a judgment of conviction, and (2) a jury is duly impaneled to try and
determine the issue. 4 A fortiori, he is placed in jeopardy when the jury
returns its verdict, regardless of whether judgment is entered thereon; 5
this is true even when the accused has not been arraigned and there has
been a failure to plead to the indictment or information.6 At common law,
if any evidence had been offered at the trial, the court could not discharge
the jury until it had rendered its verdict, except in a case of urgent necessity such as serious illness of a juror during the trial. Today, however, the
jury may be discharged before the verdict and after the members have been
sworn in if the court in the exercise of its sound discretion feels that it is
manifestly necessary to do so. Should the court discharge the jury for any
reason legally insufficient, without absolute necessity and without the
consent of the accused, such discharge is equivalent to an acquittal and
may be pleadet as a bar to any subsequent indictment or information for
CONST. Decl. of Rights §12.
'Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796).
'Fla. Laws 1891, c. 4055, §7, now FLA. STAT. §910.11 (1941).
'State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435, 23 So.2d 484 (1945); Burnes v.
'FLA.

State, 89 Fla. 494, 104 So. 783 (1925).
'Potter v. State, 91 Fla. 938, 109 So. 91 (1926).

eState ex rel. Ryan v. McNeil, 141 Fla. 304, 193 So. 67 (1940).
v. State, 128 Fla. 35, 174 So. 466 (1937).
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the same offensf. 7 The cause sufficient to create the necessity for discharge of the jury falls under one of two main categories, namely:
(1) legal compulsion upon the court to discharge the jury before it
is able to reach a verdict, as, for example, in the familiar in8
stance of the "hung jury."
(2) conduct of the accused rendering proper investigation of the
case beyond the power of the jury, whether occasioned by
misconduct or by physical inability to attend the trial.9
Following the general principle that a civil proceeding does not constitute jeopardy sufficient to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the
same acts, a proceeding in equity to suppress, by way of an injunction,
conduct that also constitutes a crime will not bar the subsequent criminal
prosecution;1 o nor will the annulment of the judgment in a criminal case
upon a writ of error coram nobis prevent a further trial upon the merits,
because the proceedings under such a writ are civil in nature; 11 nor will an
award of punitive or exemplary damages in a civil action for tort prevent
a subsequent prosecution for the substantive crime committed through such
tortious conduct.' 2 A mistrial will not constitute jeopardy unless it is
arbitrarily or capriciously ordered by the court;13 nor will an entry of
nolle prosequi, following a mistrial by reason of the jury's inability to
agree, constitute jeopardy.' 4 When a new trial is granted at the instance
of the accused after a conviction of one of the lesser degrees of the crime
charged in the indictment or information the accused stands charged upon
the new trial with the crime for which he was previously convicted, just as
though no previous trial had been held. Jeopardy ceases to exist when
the court grants a motion for new trial, because there is no appeal available to the prosecution.' 5
'State ex rel. Dato v. Himes, 134 Fla. 675, 184 So. 244 (1938).
8
FLA. STAT. §919.21(2) (1941) ; White v. State, 63 Fla. 49, 59 So. 17 (1912).
OFLA. STAT. §§54.22, 919.21(3) (1941) ; Fails v. State, 60 Fla. 8, 53 So. 612 (1910).

"Pompano Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927).
"Chambers v. State, 117 Fla. 642, 158 So. 153 (1934), rev'd on other grounds, 309
U. S.227 (1940); cf. 2 U. or FLA. L. REV. 131 (1949).
"Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117 (1882).

"Smith v. State, 40 Fla. 203, 23 So. 854 (1898).
"Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939); Gibson v. State, 26 Fla. 109,
7 So. 376 (1890).
"McLeod v. State, 128 Fla. 35, 174 So. 466 (1937) ; see FLA. STAT. §920.09 (1941).
In upholding a state statute which permitted an appeal by the prosecution in a

criminal case, the United States Supreme Court, while ruling that the double jeopardy
clause, U. S. CONST. A'mEND. V, is inapplicable to the states, cautioned that such procedure is limited by the due process clause, U. S. CONST.
necticut, 302 U. S.319 (1937).
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II. THE PLEA

The right of one charged with the commission of a criminal offense
to the protection of the former jeopardy clause of the Florida Constitution 16 must be specifically pleaded, and the supporting facts must be
proved. 1 7 In other words, there must be a timely assertion of the claim
by the accused, with such allegations as are sufficient to show, if proved
by him or admitted by the prosecution, that the constitutional provision is
about to be, or is being, violated. While it is generally stated that a plea
of former conviction must set out the former judgment and allege that it is
in full force and effect and unreversed,' 8 this is not required in a plea of
former acquittal, as the verdict of acquittal is final and cannot be reversed on appeal without placing the accused in jeopardy twice.' 9 A plea
of former jeopardy, when properly and sufficiently pleaded, can be traversed or demurred to, but a motion to strike is improper and will not be
entertained by the court. 20 The plea must contain sufficient grounds, or
the court may treat it as frivolous or a nullity; no demurrer or traverse is
2
necessary to dispose of such a plea. 3

A plea of "not guilty," which is a plea in bar, is a waiver of the right
to make a plea in abatement in a criminal case,2 2 unless the defendant is
able to obtain leave of court to withdraw his first plea. By so doing he
can then interpose a plea in abatement based on former jeopardy; 23 this
plea must be disposed of before the defendant can make a plea in bar.
There is an exception to this rule, however. If upon a new trial the
accused pleads "not guilty" to an indictment again charging the same
offense, when the fact is that he was acquitted of such charge on the former trial by virtue of a conviction of a lesser degree thereof, he may subsequently make a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground of former
acquittal; and the motion will be granted by the court when such facts
appear on the record, because the entire proceedlng constitutes one
24
record.
"FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §12.
"Ibid.; Potter v. State, 91 Fla. 938, 109 So. 91 (1926) ; Strobbar v. State, 55 Fla.

167, 47 So. 4 (1908) ; O'Brien v. State, 55 Fla. 146, 47 So. 11 (1908).
"O'Brien v. State, 55 Fla. 146, 47 So. 11 (1908).
"9Potter v. State, 91 Fla. 938, 109 So. 91 (1926).
"J'ohnson v. State, 27 Fia. 245, 9 So. 208 (1891).
"-Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889).
"'Walker v. State, 93 Fla. 1069, 113 So. 96 (1927).
"Haddock v. State, 141 Fla. 132, 192 So. 802 (1939).
"'Golding v. State, 31 Fla. 262, 12 So. 525 (1893).
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By obtaining release under a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
the former conviction rested on an invalid indictment, information or
charge, the accused succeeds in having such judgment of conviction set
aside and nullified; therefore he cannot subsequently plead former jeopardy
to a second prosecution for the same crime. 25 In asserting a defense based
on former jeopardy, the writ of prohibition is not the proper method, since
former jeopardy is a defensive matter and presents a question that can
readily be raised by a proper plea in the trial courL26

III. TESTs

OV THE IDENTITY O1 OFFENSES

In England in 1796 a test of double jeopardy was formulated. 2 7 By
this test an acquittal is no bar unless conviction on the first indictment
could have been obtained by proof of the facts contained in the second.
This "same evidence" test has received wide recognition in this country
and is applied frequently by the federal courts, 2 8 although a minority of
states follow the "same transaction" test and hold that a prosecution for
one offense bars a subsequent prosecution for another offense when both
29
result from a single transaction.
To sustain a plea of former jeopardy in Florida, each of four prerequisites must be met by the two indictments or informations:
(1) identity as regards the victims and as regards those accused;
(2) identity of jurisdictions;
(3) identity of acts and circumstances occasioning the alleged
offense; and
(4) identity of offenses charged, speaking broadly and in a loose

sense. 3 0
The first of these requirements needs no clarification, as a recent case
has demonstrated. The accused had killed two boys at the same time,
by the same act, and was tried in a separate criminal case for each death.
After being acquitted on the first indictment and later convicted on the
second, he appealed on the ground of former jeopardy. Although he was
" State v. Drumbright, 116 Fla. 496, 156 So. 721 (1934).
"State ex rel. Johnson v. Anderson, 37 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1948); State v. Drumbright,
116 Fla. 496, 156 So. 721 (1934).
"Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796).
"'Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338 (1911).
20
Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632 (1896) ; Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420, 13
Am. Rep. 369 (1873); State v. Speedling, 199 Iowa 1218, 201 N. W. 561 (1925).
"State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18 So.2d 478 (1944); King v. State, 145 Fla. 286,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss2/4
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convicted of one offense, the victims were not identical; and the Supreme
Court, in holding that double jeopardy did not exist, quite properly de31
scribed the two trials as separate.
As to the second essential, a prosecution for violation of the laws of
one jurisdiction does not constitute a bar to a subsequent prosecution for
the violation of the laws of another jurisdiction, even though the other
32
prerequisites to former jeopardy are present.
The third requirement is also readily understood and is well established, in spite of a misleading dictum contained in a recent opinion. 33 There
is no question that the same legal offense committed in the same jurisdiction
by the same accused against the same victim nevertheless constitutes two
34
crimes if committed at different times or by different acts.
The fourth prerequisite occasions little difficulty in instances of qualitatively different offenses, as, for example, rape and burglary, or even
breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny and being an
accessory before the fact to grand larceny; 3 5 but complications do arise
when the earlier and later offenses charged lie within a category of crime
divided into degrees, such as murder. 3 6 For example, suppose that an
indictment is returned charging a person with murder in the second degree.
Should the jury return a verdict acquitting the accused, that verdict would
act as an acquittal of murder in the second or any greater degree, but the
state could subsequently prosecute him for any lesser degree of crime in the
same category. 3 7 Conversely, a verdict of guilty would bar a subsequent
prosecution for murder in the §econd or any lesser degree of murder. 3 8 In
other words, it definitely can be stated that an acquittal embraces the same
or a greater degree, while conviction includes the same or a lesser, provided
the offenses charged are in the same category.
199 So. 38 (1940).

"McHugh v. State, 36 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1948).
"Hunt v. Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 16 So. 398 (1894).

"McHugh v. State, 36 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1948).
"Albritton v. State, 137 Fla. 20, 187 So. 601 (1939); cf. Taylor v. State, 138 Fla.
762, 190 So. 262 (1939).

"Ex parte Clarkson, 72 Fla. 220, 72 So. 675 (1916); accord, Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932) (federal law) ; see Thomas v. State, 74 Fla. 200, 206, 76
So. 780, 782 (1917) ; cf. State v. Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30 So.2d 744 (1947) ; Bacom v.
State, 39 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1949).
"F'LA. STAT. §782.04 (1941).
"'King v. State, 145 Fla. 286, 199 So. 38 (1940); see Pottinger v. State, 122 Fla.
405, 407, 165 So. 276, 277 (1936).
"McLeod v. State, 128 Fla. 35, 174 So. 466 (1937).
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Furthermore, in reaching a decision as to former jeopardy, one must
consider not merely the crime of which the accused was convicted but also
that with which he was charged. If, for example, the indictment or information charges murder in the second degree and the accused is convicted of third degree murder, this verdict necessarily constitutes an acquittal
of murder in the second degree because the jury had to pass on the accusation; the result is that he would be twice placed in jeopardy for the same
offense if subsequently prosecuted for second degree murder.3 9
It can also logically be contended, inasmuch as Section 919.14 of
Florida Statutes 1941 provides that the judge is to charge the jury that
it may return a verdict of guilty of any lesser degree of the crime charged,
that an acquittal in Florida is an acquittal of all such lesser degrees and
bars a subsequent prosecution for any of them.
Still another principle is that an intervening change in the result of the
acts, occurring after the first conviction, opens the door to a second prosecution based on the same acts and circumstances, though for a higher
degree of crime. 40 For example, a conviction of assault in a justice of the
peace court has been held not to bar a prosecution for manslaughter in the
circuit court upon the death of the victim following the first trial, even
though the second indictment was based on the same acts and circumstances. 41 In an analogous situation, when there were no intervening facts,
it was held that a justice of the peace court did not have jurisdiction of
the felony charged in the circuit court, with the result that the prosecution
for the lower degree of the same offense in the justice of the peace court
did not constitute a bar to the subsequent prosecution for felony. 42 In
such situations the courts are prone to permit the second prosecution because of the opportunity presented to the defendant for obtaining a fraudulent conviction in the first trial. 4 3
Finally, does a conviction of the crime charged bar a second prosecution in the same court for a greater degree of offense in the same cate-

" E.g., Haddock v. State, 141 Fla. 132, 192 So. 802 (1939); McLeod v. State, supra
note 39; West v. State, 55 Fla. 200, 46 So. 93 (1908); Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245,
9 So. 208 (1891).
"Sanford v. State, 74 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918).
"See Southworth v. State, 98 Fla. 1184, 125 So. 345 (1929).
"Alford v. State, 25 Fla. 852, 6 So. 857 (1889).
"State v. Reed, 26 Conn. 201 (1857); Commonwealth v. Alderman, 4 Mass. 477
(1808); State v. Little, 1 N. H. 257 (1818); State v. Lowry, 1 Swan 34, 31 Tenn.
40 (1851).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss2/4
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gory when no new factual result intervenes? Logically it should not, since
the more serious offense has been neither passed on nor charged. As
against this there is the practical consideration that the state can choose
whatever accusation it wishes to make; and, having elected with all the
facts available, it should not be permitted to try the accused again merely
because of an inept choice. The reasoning in the various opinions implies
that the former view prevails in Florida, since they constantly refer to the
offense first charged when limiting the scope of a subsequent prosecution, 44 although Florida dicta and general textual material strongly
support the latter position. 4 5 In many of the more thickly populated
states such a situation has been squarely presented and decided according
to the general rule that when the facts constitute but one offense, even
though it is susceptible of division into parts, a series of prosecutions cannot be carved therefrom. Most states follow this latter view. 4 6 It is submitted that Florida courts should apply it if and when such a problem
presents itself, with the qualification that the former trial must not have
been obtained fraudulently on an inadequate information or indictment
resulting from what is popularly known as "fixing" the public prosecutor.

IV. CONCLUSION
The protection afforded against double jeopardy is embodied in our
Constitution in the short and inornate sentence, "No man shall be subject
to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." These few words guarantee one of the most valuable rights of every citizen. The elasticity of
"Boswell v. State, 20 Fla. 869 (1884) ; see State v. Febre, 156 Fla. 149, 151, 23 So.2d
270, 271 (1945) ; Faulkner v. State, 146 Fla. 769, 770, 1 So.2d 857 (1941) ; Albritton
v. State, 137 Fla. 20, 25, 187 So. 601, 603 (1939); State v. Lewis, 118 Fla. 910, 913,
160 So. 485, 486 (1935); West v. State, 55 Fla. 200, 205, 46 So. 93, 95 (1908) ; Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245, 260, 9 So. 208, 209 (1891).
"See Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393, 396, 78 So. 340, 341 (1918), and texts therein
cited; cf. FLA. STAT. §920.09 (1941), relating to new trial.
'Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333 (1907); Powell v. State, 89 Ala. 172, 8
So. 109 (1890); Floyd v. State, 80 Ark. 94, 96 S. W. 125 (1906); People v. Defoor,
100 Cal. 150, 34 Pac. 642 (1893); Bell v. State, 103 Ga. 397, 30 S. E. 294 (1898);
Territory v. Silva, 27 Hawaii 270 (1923), overruling Territory v. Schilling, 17 Hawaii
249 (1906); State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879); Commonwealth v. Miller, 5 Dana 320
(Ky. 1837); State v. Cheevers, 7 La. Ann. 40 (1852); Commonwealth v. Roby, 12
Pick. 496 (Mass. 1832); State v. Wondra, 114 Minn. 457, 131 N. W. 496 (1911);
State v. Snyder, 50 N. H. 150 (1870); State v. Cooper, 31 N. J. L. 361 (1833);
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